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INTRODUCTION
1 The so-called Minsk II agreements were signed by Russia, Ukraine, Germany and France in 2015 after the apparent failure of the Minsk agreements 
concluded by Russia and Ukraine in 2014. It provides a detailed roadmap for resolving the conflict in Ukraine, its implementation should be overseen by the 
OSCE.
With the beginning of the millennium, the Visegrad 
countries – the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary 
and Slovakia, started to improve their relations with 
Russia, which had only recently recovered from 
the turbulent times following the disintegration 
of the Soviet Union. Due to historical linkages and 
favourable geographical location, this development, 
together with the 2004 enlargement of the EU, set in 
motion various processes that had a positive effect 
on their mutual cooperation. Nevertheless, the 
Russian annexation of Crimea and its involvement in 
the war in Eastern Ukraine represented a major shift 
in relations with Russia for the Visegrad countries. 
Beyond the political level, the rise in tensions 
between the West and Russia soured over the crisis, 
and these tensions had a significant impact also on 
mutual economic ties and cooperation between 
Russia and the Visegrad states. 
Since March 2014, the EU began to adopt a series of 
restrictive measures against Russia in response to the 
annexation of Crimea and the continued support for 
destabilization in Eastern Ukraine. In particular, the 
EU targeted persons and legal entities responsible for 
actions which appeared to undermine the territorial 
integrity and independence of Ukraine (their list has 
gradually expanded and currently includes 153 people 
and 40 entities) and restricted economic exchange 
with Crimea. In addition, the so-called sectoral 
sanctions were introduced. They limited the export 
of weapons or dual use goods (items that could be 
used in the military industry) and curtailed access to 
certain sensitive technologies and services that could 
be employed for oil production and exploration. 
The EU imposed also restrictions on mid-and long-
term crediting for a list of sanctioned companies. 
The duration of sanctions has been conditioned on 
the full implementation of the Minsk agreements.1 
In August 2014, Russia responded to these actions 
with its own counter-sanctions. It adopted a decree 
banning the imports of selected agricultural products, 
raw materials and food supplies from countries and 
organisations that were behind the enactment of 
Ukraine-related sanctions upon Russia. 
Despite the Visegrad countries’ continued 
support for the prolonging of the sanctions, which 
were ultimately designed to alter Russia´s behavior 
in Ukraine, a clear asymmetry between the official 
diplomatic positions and the political rhetoric 
directed at domestic audiences is often visible. 
Several politicians and business representatives 
from the Visegrad countries have vocally challenged 
the effectiveness of sanctions and called for their 
dissolution, the overarching argument being that 
Russia represents an indispensable market for their 
countries. Given the continuing popularity of this 
rhetoric, thus undermining the official diplomacy of 
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the Visegrad countries and causing confusion among 
their European partners, it is therefore important 
to ask: to which extent are such claims relevant? In 
which ways did the conflict in Ukraine and the severe 
cool-down of relations with Russia influence mutual 
economic cooperation and economic performance of 
the individual Visegrad countries?
This study seeks to answer these questions by 
shedding light on the development of economic 
relations between the individual Visegrad countries 
and Russia prior to the conflict in Ukraine, and 
highlighting changes and continuities following 
the imposition of sanctions regime. It draws on 
various findings of a year-long project that sought to 
examine impacts of sanctions on the economies of 
the Visegrad countries, assess bilateral instruments 
meant to foster economic cooperation, and delve into 
the extent to which linkages in the economic domain 
can affect political decision-making. In addition, it 
took into consideration energy dependencies on 
Russia, as an important factor in mutual relations.
This project was led by the Prague Security 
Studies Institute (PSSI, Czech Republic) in cooperation 
with three think-tanks from the other Visegrad 
countries: The Centre for Polish-Russian Dialogue and 
Understanding (CPDRiP, Poland), the Centre for Euro-
Atlantic Integration and Democracy (CEID, Hungary), 
and the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA, 
Slovakia). Each of the project partners have been 
responsible for delivering analyses concerning their 
respective countries and contributing to this study.
In order to stress the regional dimension and 
point out similarities and differences among Visegrad 
countries’ economic relations with Russia and 
approaches towards it, the structure of the study is 
organised by topics rather than countries. The first 
chapter provides a summary of the development of 
individual countries’ trade relations with Russia. The 
second chapter assesses impacts of sanctions and 
map political debates accompanying them. The third 
chapter explores how the worsening of relations 
with Russia influenced the work of institutional 
mechanisms designed to promote mutual economic 
cooperation. The last chapter looks into Russia’s role 
in energy supplies to the Visegrad countries and their 
political implications.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE BETWEEN 
THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES AND RUSSIA, 2008—2016
Graph 1: Bilateral trade of the Visegrad countries and Russia
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2 If not mentioned otherwise, all data used in this study come from Eurostat.
3 See the Supplement for the classifi cation.
Czech Republic
In terms of trade volume, Czech-Russian economic 
relations reached its peak in 2012, after a slight decline 
caused by the 2008 global economic crisis. From a 
historical perspective, bilateral trade dynamics hit its 
lowest point at the end of the 1990s as a result of the 
reorientation of the Czechoslovak economy towards 
western markets and Russia’s economic diffi  culties. 
Even before enlargement of the EU in 2004, Czech 
exports destined for the Russian market began to 
demonstrate an upward trajectory. During the years 
2003-2012 these exports increased by approximately 
tenfold. In 2012, they made up 3,8 % of total exports. 
On the other hand, Czech imports from Russia were 
even higher and in 2012 they represented 5,2 % of total 
imports.2 At the time, Russia ranked among the top 
fi ve importing countries for at least seven consecutive 
years. As can be seen in Graph 2, the Czech Republic 
has traditionally maintained a trade defi cit with 
Russia. On the import side, Russia has predominantly 
supplied strategic raw materials in the form of oil and 
gas. According to the Standard International Trade 
Classifi cation (SITC)3, the category of mineral fuels, 
lubricants and related materials (SITC 3) composed 86 
% of the total imports from Russia, while in 2016 this 
percentage dropped to 65,7  %. This drop, however, 
mainly refl ects the plunge in commodity prices 
rather than an actual drop in import volumes. Exports 
to Russia have been heavily oriented towards the 
machine industry. In 2013, machinery and transport 
equipment (SITC 7) heading to Russia represented 71 % 
of total exports, and by 2016 this fi gure has decreased 
to 61,5 % (See the Supplement for more details about 
the structure of Czech trade with Russia). In addition, 
within this category, the car industry represented 
almost half and thus contributed with approximately 
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30% of the share in terms of exports destined for the 
Russian market.4
The growth of Czech-Russian bilateral trade 
started slowing down in 2013 and since 2014 the value 
of the trade has experienced a sharp decrease. The 
mutual trade between Czech and Russian markets 
experienced a signifi cant fall around the second half 
of 2014 in light of the adoption of sanctions against 
Russia, then fully materialized in 2015 refl ecting the 
plunge in oil prices and continued into 2016. To give 
a sense of the change, in 2016 Russia with a share of 
1,9  % appeared in thirteenth place on the list of the 
most important export destinations, whereas in 
2013 it was ranked seventh (Graph 3). The decline in 
imports has been even more signifi cant, especially 
thanks to a decrease in commodity prices. The 
share fell to 1,6 % of total imports in 2016 and Russia 
currently ranks thirteenth on the list of importing 
countries (Graph 4). As a result, in 2016 the Czech 
Republic for the fi rst time achieved a positive trade 
4 “Materiál „Hodnocení dopadů sankcí v rámci ukrajinské krize“,” The offi  cial governmental document assessing impact of sanctions, https://ipodpora.odbory.
info/soubory/dms/wysiwyg_uploads/a05b113e9f39c8af/uploads/Hodnoceni-dopadu-sankci-v-ramci-ukrajinske-krize.pdf (accessed 10/01/2017).
balance with Russia (Graph 2). Between 2012–2016 a 
total trade turnover with Russia fell by more than 
54 % from 10,3 billion euro to 4,8 billion euro.
Even though the Russian foreign direct investment 
(FDI) remains relatively small in comparison to other 
countries, there is at least one case worth mentioning. 
The company Škoda JS, which focuses on the 
production of components for nuclear power plants, 
was bought in 2003 by the company OMZ (owned 
by Russian state company Gazprom). Škoda JS takes 
part in projects concerning nuclear plants abroad, 
including the modernization of Hungarian nuclear 
plant Paks, and supervises the technological state of 
Czech nuclear power plants.
Although these numbers might not seem 
signifi cant when placed in the context of trade 
dependencies within the EU, which accounts for 
more than three quarters of the total of Czech foreign 
trade, Russia still ranks among the most important 
trade partner outside of the European Union.
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IMPORTS EXPORTS BALANCE OF TRADE
Graph 2: Czech-Russian Bilateral Trade
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Graph 3: Czech Exports to Russia and Other Countries
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Graph 4: Czech Imports from Russia and Other Countries
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Poland
Trade relations between Poland and Russia after 
the 2004 enlargement of the EU had a very positive 
upward trajectory. Trade turnover increased up to 26,8 
billion euro in 2013 (almost tenfold since the beginning 
of the millennium). The composition of goods traded 
was at that time, and still is, typical of Russia’s relations 
with other developed states. Russia supplied mostly 
fuel and energy carriers (oil, oil products, gas, coal) to 
Poland while Poland supplied a wider array of goods 
(machinery, manufactured goods, chemicals, food and 
beverages). As can be seen in the Graph 5, Poland had 
traditionally maintained a significant trade deficit with 
Russia (second only to China) due to high crude oil 
and natural gas prices.
To put these numbers in their proper context, 
Russia has consistently been in the past an important 
trade partner for Poland, but never a vital one. In 2010, 
Polish exports to Russia accounted for 4,2 % of its total 
exports, which put the Eastern neighbor on par with 
the Netherlands, or somewhere between Slovakia 
and the Czech Republic if the Visegrad countries are 
taken as a reference point. In just five years, however, 
Russia’s ranking has fallen (to 2,9  % of total exports) 
due to political and economic turmoil caused by 
sanctions against the Kremlin (Graph  6). Thus, the 
value of Polish exports to the Czech Republic (6,6% 
share in 2015)5 – a country whose population is just 
a quarter of Poland’s – more than doubled the value 
of exports to Russia, which has a population four 
times the size of Poland’s. These numbers underline 
the dichotomy between the real and perceived 
importance of the Russian market for Polish 
producers. Polish exports have been mostly directed 
towards the EU market (above 75 % on average). As a 
result, the vulnerability of Polish exporters, though 
not negligible, was relatively low, in particular when 
real data was confronted with quite a popular image 
of a sizeable and profitable Russian market.6
The value of the Polish-Russian trade turnover has 
ostensibly suffered a decline from 26,8 billion euro in 
2013 to 15,5 billion euro in 2016. Fewer exports to Russia 
were caused by both the restrictions on imports of 
Polish food and failing domestic demand in Russia 
brought on by the recession and the weakening of 
5 “Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics 2016,” Central Statistical Office of Poland, https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/statistical-yearbooks/statistical-yearbooks/
yearbook-of-foreign-trade-statistics-2016,9,10.html (accessed 20/02/2017).
6 ”Raport – Skutki rosyjskiego embargo na polskie produkty,” Związek Przedsiębiorców i Pracodawców,(Union of Entrepreneurs and Employers), September 
2016, Warszawa, http://zpp.net.pl/upload/omt8u0_08.09.2016RaportZPPSkutkirosyjskiegoembarganapolskieprodukty.pdf (accessed 20/02/2017).
7 See: Adam Grezeszak, “Rosjanie podchodzą pod Tarnów,” Polityka, July 15, 2014, http://www.polityka.pl/tygodnikpolityka/rynek/1585837,1,polsko-rosyjski-
boj-o-grupe-azoty.read; or ; Marek Rabij, “Rosyjski kapitał w Polsce? Prawie nieobecny,” Newsweek.pl, May 5, 2014, http://www.newsweek.pl/biznes/
rosyjskie-inwestycje-w-polsce-newsweek-pl,artykuly,285428,1.html (accessed 05/02/2017.
the ruble. The drop in the value of imports from Russia 
can mainly be explained by lower oil prices (Graph 7). 
However, weaker trade relations between Poland and 
Russia did not affect the overall, positive dynamics of 
Polish exports which rose by 28,6 billion euro from 
2013–2016, despite the drop in the value of exports 
to Russia by 2,9 billion euro. Moreover, foreign trade 
aggregated data indicates that Poland benefited 
from the drop in fuel prices as there was a significant 
decrease in Poland’s trade deficit with Russia, from 10,5 
billion euro in 2013 to 5,1 billion euro in 2016 (Graph 5).
When it comes to investments, their respective 
FDIs prove inconsequential, highlighting an unusual 
symmetry between the two countries. The cumulative 
Polish FDI in Russia is negligible (though important for 
some individual Polish companies). The same can be 
said for Russia’s FDI in Poland. It is limited to Gazprom’s 
share in the ownership of the Yamal-Europe gas 
pipeline, the ownership of a network of gas stations 
by Lukoil and – to include a less politically sensitive 
domain – the Russian Standard takeover of some 
traditional Polish brands of vodka. Again, in comparison 
to Western investments it is close to nothing. 
However, this analysis is not complete. Russian 
companies, with the support of their government, 
repeatedly tested Poland’s willingness to pave the 
way for larger Russian involvement in their economy. 
These efforts were targeted at refineries, the chemical 
industry (Russian Acron’s attempt to take control over 
Polish chemical holding Azoty for example) and banks 
(Sberbank’s unsuccessful effort to buy Alior Bank). 
Such efforts were primarily intended to stretch the 
value chain of the Russian oil and gas sectors through 
the seizure of major consumers of Russian fuels and 
feedstock. Both official proposals put on the table 
by representatives of the Russian government, and 
closed-door attempts for hostile take-overs failed.7 
Subsequent Polish governments were afraid that 
Russian ambitions toward their economy were not 
just commercially, but also politically, driven. This 
conviction was reinforced by recurring episodes of 
both large and small-scale gas crises directly related 
to Russian-Ukrainian disputes, and interpreted as a 
way to both apply pressure on Poland and promoting 
Russian interests abroad (e.g. Nord Stream). Highly 
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polarized Polish policy-makers broadly supported 
the application of the ‘precautionary principle’ when 
it came to inviting large Russian businesses into the 
Polish economy, especially into sectors deemed as 
strategic. On the whole, neither trade (except for 
that of energy which deserves special attention) nor 
investment relations created signifi cant political or 
economic vulnerabilities.
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Graph 5: Polish-Russian Bilateral Trade
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Graph 6: Polish Exports to Russia and Other Countries
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Graph 7: Polish Imports from Russia and Other Countries
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Hungary
Hungarian trade and investment dynamics with 
Russia show many similarities with other CEE patterns. 
The Russian share of roughly 3,5  % in total exports 
was enough to become Hungary’s largest export 
destination outside the EU in the late 2000s. Hungarian 
imports from Russia are comprised almost exclusively 
of minerals and fuels, while other products have a 
negligible share. Prior to 2014, Hungarian exports to 
Russia increased considerably, simultaneously with 
trade dynamics of other European countries.8 Mutual 
investments have been statistically insignificant, with 
sporadic and visible Russian hostile takeover attempts 
in Hungary, and some dedicated projects of leading 
Hungarian companies in Russia.
Trade volumes had been growing intensively until 
the 2008–2009 crisis due to a strong Russian internal 
demand and booming energy prices. The Hungarian 
positive export performance was primarily due to the 
increase in machinery and transport equipment (SITC 
7). Between 2000–2011, it grew 15 times in value, while 
its share in total exports rose from 18,6  % to 53,5  %. 
Machinery and other manufactured goods (SITC 6–7) 
comprised 73,6 % of the entire incremental growth in 
total exports (See the Supplement for more details). 
This hints at the fundamental role of local affiliates 
of multinational companies in Hungary’s export 
performance. In contrast, trade in food and drink 
products (SITC 0+1), a sector much more dominated 
by domestically-owned suppliers, grew by negligible 
levels, a sheer 8,9 % between 2000–2011.
The years 2009 and 2014 have become two 
significant watersheds in Hungarian trade dynamics 
(Graph 8). Between 2010–2013, trade turnover rate 
stagnated, reflecting primarily the Russian economic 
slowdown and the decreasing price of oil. Since the 
summer of 2014, due to the imposing of sanctions 
and the drop in oil prices, bilateral trade has fallen by 
levels comparable to the proportions of EU member 
countries. At a statistical glance, Hungarian-Russian 
economic relations show little peculiarity; they hold 
the typical characteristics of CEE-Russia ties.
The fall in Russian demand after 2013 has hit 
Hungarian exports rather harshly. By 2016, total 
Hungarian exports to Russia fell by 44,1  % from their 
2013 levels. Nonetheless, the large sum of the decrease 
in total exports (81,9  % of it) came from the above-
mentioned two sectors, “machinery and transport 
equipment” and “other manufactured goods.” Thus, 
it is reasonable to assume that the crisis has primarily 
affected the multinational companies and the 
8 Russia’s share in both total exports and imports peaked in 2008 at 3,61 % and 8,98 %, respectively.
non-sanctioned segments (since Hungary does not 
produce military or energy equipment in reasonable 
scales). This severe impact is not comparable to the 
2009 collapse – it is much deeper and has not been 
followed by a sharp recovery until now. Other product 
groups, such as food and drink or chemicals show 
a much more balanced picture with only moderate 
fallbacks and impacts of a less structural character.
The drop in exports is specific to the Russian case, 
since (as shown in the Graph 9) Hungarian exports 
in general have been growing rather dynamically. 
Accordingly, the Russia’s share in Hungarian exports 
fell drastically between 2013 and 2016, from 3,12  % 
to 1,53 %. Russia has lost its long-time ranking as the 
largest non-EU export destination, and fell to the fifth 
position by 2016, with countries such as Ukraine and 
Turkey overtaking it. The drop in Russian-related trade 
has massively contributed to the overall decrease in 
Hungarian non-EU exports.
Similar trends, even with different origins, can be 
observed on the Hungarian import side. The drop 
in oil and gas prices since 2014 has reconfigured the 
relevance of Russia; nowadays, imports consist almost 
exclusively of mineral fuels (SITC 3). In 2013, they 
constituted 89,9 % of the total. Consequently, the drop 
in oil and gas prices was the single most important 
reason why imports decreased by 62,9  % between 
2013–2016. Russia’s share in Hungarian imports also fell 
from 8,48 % in 2013 to 2,81 % in 2016 (Graph 10).
In the longer time series, there is a specific 
Hungarian phenomenon observable, namely the 
significant decrease in Hungarian gas consumption. 
Gas demand has practically halved in the last decade, 
falling from above 12 million tons of oil in 2005 to 
around 7 million in 2014. All major segments of 
demand have been shrinking, including the industrial 
demand, the residential demand, and the power 
plants’ demand. This process seems to be irreversible 
in its full magnitude, and the demand for gas will 
hardly fully recover in the foreseeable future.
Hungarian-Russian trade balance has remained 
passive, even if it has improved remarkably, falling 
from 3,9 billion euro in 2013 to below one billion euro 
in 2016 (Graph 8). The passive balance is natural, due 
to the fact that the lion’s share of Hungarian energy 
imports originate from Russia. In terms of industrial 
products and high value-added production, Hungary 
maintains a strong active balance.
Russian FDI and corporate presence is almost 
invisible in Hungary. Even if we add Russian-related 
investment coming from Western countries, from 
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Cyprus or investments made by Russians residing 
in Hungary. According to these authors’ estimates 
published in “The Kremlin Playbook”9 (2014), the total 
turnover rate of Russian-related companies remained 
below 3  % of total Hungarian corporate revenues at 
best. These investments were predominantly made 
in the energy and fi nancial spheres. There were only 
a handful of cases when Russian businesses invested 
into metallurgy, machine-building or tourism. 
Hungarian FDI in Russia mainly consists of large 
Hungarian companies. Hungary’s pharmaceutical 
companies, Richter and Egis maintained their 
Soviet roots and established solid footholds in 
9 Heather A. Conley et al. ”The Kremlin Playbook – Understanding Russian Infl uence in Central and Eastern Europe.” Centre for strategic and international 
studies, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/1601017_Conley_KremlinPlaybook_Web.pdf (accessed 14/01/2017).
the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Hungary’s leading retail bank, OTP Bank, has its third 
and fourth largest asset-based presence in Russia and 
Ukraine. In 2013, the Hungarian oil and gas company 
Mol divested three upstream assets in Western 
Siberia. By the end of 2016, Mol has preserved only 
one upstream asset (operating in the Volga-Urals 
region). All these investments provide indirect 
evidence of high entry barriers on the Russian market. 
Small and medium-sized enterprises and agricultural 
producers have failed to establish a solid presence 
in Russia, and are still trying to cope with diffi  culties 
stemming from a smaller scale of economies.
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Graph 8: Hungarian-Russian Bilateral Trade
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Graph 9: Hungarian Exports to Russia and Other Countries
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Graph 10: Hungarian Imports from Russia and Other Countries
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Slovakia
Since the Russian aggression in Ukraine in 2014, and 
the imposing of sanctions against Russia (and counter-
sanctions against the EU), many Slovak political elites, 
led by the Prime Minister Robert Fico, have been 
stressing the importance of material linkages between 
Slovakia and Russia.10 Bilateral economic cooperation is 
primarily defined by the purchase and transit of energy 
resources. Due to the lack of sufficient mineral reserves, 
Slovakia is largely dependent on such imports from 
Russia. The main commodities imported are natural 
gas, oil, nuclear fuel, hard coal, and iron ore.11 Moreover, 
Slovakia is a strategic transit territory through which 
important pipelines for transporting Russian gas and 
oil are built and regulated for the delivery of supplies 
to Russia’s Western consumers through connections 
in the Czech Republic and Austria. Slovakia’s goal is to 
maintain its position as a transit country.
From the 2016 data of Eurostat, the top three 
export partners for Slovakia are Germany, the Czech 
Republic, and Poland. Slovakia’s import partners 
consist of Germany, the Czech Republic, and Austria. 
Moreover, it is important to highlight that 85,2  % of 
Slovakia´s export goes to the EU countries. Slovakian 
exports to Russia mostly consist of cars, electric 
machinery and equipment, printing products and 
stationery, and finally medications and consumables. 
The Russian Federation has been the most significant 
trade partner outside of the EU for Slovakia. As can 
be seen on the Graph 11, as Slovak exports to Russia 
had been gradually increasing up until 2013, so too 
did Russian imports to Slovakia. However, the share 
of exports to Russia as compared to total Slovak 
export was decreasing even before the sanctions 
were imposed (Graph 12). The share of imports from 
the Russian Federation to Slovakia was around 10  % 
of total imports before the restrictive measures. Once 
those were imposed, the share dropped by nearly 
half (Graph 13), and it still continues to fall.
Since 2014, the decrease in Slovak exports to the 
Russian Federation was significant. Comparisons of 
the data from 2013 and 2016 suggest that the export 
losses to Russia accounted for 40,2 %, and the import 
to Slovakia decreased by 43,4 %. According to Eurostat, 
10 Igor Stupňa, “Fico: Spolupráca EÚ a Ruskaj je nevyhnutná,” Pravda,, June 16, 2016, https://spravy.pravda.sk/domace/clanok/396277-fico-spolupraca-eu-a-
ruska-je-nevyhnutna/ (accessed 09/01/2017). 
11 “Rusko-Slovenské vzťahy,” Official website of the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Slovak Republic. https://slovakia.mid.ru/web/svk/9 (accessed 
01/09/2017).
12 See the Supplement for the SITC classification overview.
13 Slovak Statistical Office, http://statdat.statistics.sk/cognosext/cgi-bin/cognos.cgi?b_action=xts.run&m=portal/cc.xts&gohome= (accessed 15.9.2017) 
14 “Slovensko-ruský obchod klesol o tretinu, regióny hľadajú nové formy spolupráce,“ Denník Postoj, June 8, 2016, https://www.postoj.sk/14446/slovensko-
rusky-obchod-klesol-o-tretinu-regiony-hladaju-nove-formy-spoluprace (accessed 12/09/2017).
15 “Sberbank definitely leaves Slovakia,” The Slovak Spectator, August 1, 2017, https://spectator.sme.sk/c/20616751/sberbank-definitely-leaves-slovakia.html 
(accessed 15/09/2017).
the share of the total Slovak export outside the EU 
to Russia was 23,2  % in 2013. However, this share 
decreased to 15,5 % as noted in 2015. Thus, the export 
share to Russia in relation to total exports outside the 
EU dropped by 7,7  %. The EU average in this respect 
was – 2,8  %. Overall, Slovakia was the country most 
influenced by sanctions against Russia within the V4, 
and the fourth most influenced country within the 
EU, when examining the decrease in export shares to 
Russia relative to the total exports outside the EU.
Graphs 14 and 15 illustrate the exports to Russia 
and the imports to Slovakia according to the Standard 
International Trade Classification (SITC) categories12 
in years 2013 and 2016. Observing the change, it is 
apparent that the most affected categories were 
the food and live animals (SITC 0), in consequence 
of the counter-sanctions, mineral fuels (SITC 3) and 
machinery and transport equipment (SITC 7). However, 
it is also important to acknowledge the nominal 
value of exports that have been influenced the most. 
Here we can see that other categories than SITC 7 
contribute quite minimally in terms of the nominal 
value of exports to Russia. Thus, even a considerable 
decrease due to the sanctions would not critically 
affect the overall trade. On the other hand, SITC 7 
has by far the largest volume in terms of trade with 
Russia (and the total of Slovak exports). The export 
of machinery and transport equipment decreased by 
45,3 % after imposing the restrictive measures. This 
change seems quite significant, at least at first sight.13
When it comes to regional cooperation in business, 
there are a few examples. The second largest city 
in Slovakia, Košice, is currently cooperating with 
its Russian counterpart Saint Petersburg; Žilina 
has business ties with the city Krasnoyarsk; and 
the Prešov region (the most populous and second 
largest of Slovakian regions) conducts deals with 
Volgograd. Russian companies are mostly interested in 
establishing business partnerships in engineering, the 
chemical industry, and energy.14 In the banking sector, 
the most prominent example of outsourcing was the 
Russian bank Sberbank. The Slovak branch merged 
with Prima Banka owned by the financial group PENTA 
in August 2017.15
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Graph 11: Slovak-Russian Bilateral Trade
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Graph 12: Slovak Exports to Russia and Other Countries
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Graph 13: Slovak Imports from Russia and Other Countries
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Graph 14: Slovak-Russian Exports in SITC
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Graph 15: Slovak-Russian Imports in SITC
17
EC
O
N
O
M
IC
 R
EL
AT
IO
N
S 
BE
TW
EE
N
 T
H
E 
VI
SE
G
RA
D
 C
O
U
N
TR
IE
S 
AN
D
 R
U
SS
IA
 S
U
RR
O
U
N
D
IN
G
 T
H
E 
U
KR
AI
N
IA
N
 C
RI
SI
S
IMPACTS OF THE RUSSIA SANCTIONS AND COUNTER-SANCTIONS 
AND THE POLITICAL DEBATE OVER THEM
16 Václav Trejbal, “Vliv rusko-ukrajinského konfliktu na ekonomické vztahy visegrádských zemí a Ruska,” Scientia et Societas 12 (3): 35– 60.
17 “Hamé bude žádat kompenzaci za ztráty v Rusku. Čeká škodu až sto milionů,” iDnes.cz, August 7, 2014, http://ekonomika.idnes.cz/sankce-vuci-rusku-a-
dopad-na-ceske-vyrobce-fgf-/ekonomika.aspx?c=A140807_132434_ekonomika_spi (accessed 01/05/2017).
18 Václav,Trejbal, “Vliv rusko-ukrajinského konfliktu na ekonomické vztahy visegrádských zemí a Ruska.”; Petr Kratochvíl et. al, “Ukrajinská krize: Dopady a 
rizika pro Českou republiku,” Institute of International Relations Prague (Discussion Paper), March–April 2014, http://www.dokumenty-iir.cz/DiscussionPapers/
Ukrajina.pdf (accessed 01/05/2017).
19 Věra Masopustová, et al. “Kvůli sankcím EU a Ruska a jejich dopadu na české firmy jedná vládní pracovní skupina,” iRozhlas, August 18, 2014, http://m.rozhlas.
cz/zpravy/politika/_zprava/kvuli-sankcim-eu-a-ruska-a-jejich-dopadu-na-ceske-firmy-jedna-vladni-pracovni-skupina--1385794 (accessed 01/05/2017).
20 Zuzana Švejdová, “České firmy nedostanou kompenzace za ruské sankce. Výjimkou jsou zemědělci,” iRozhlas, January 20, 2015, http://www.rozhlas.cz/
zpravy/domaciekonomika/_zprava/ceske-firmy-nedostanou-kompenzace-za-ruske-sankce-vyjimkou-jsou-zemedelci--1445924 (accessed 08/01/2017). 
21 Vadim Fojítk, Michal Půr, “Putin to nechce, pošleme to jinam,” Euro, August 25, 2014, http://www.euro.cz/archiv/putin-to-nechce-posleme-to-jinam-
1112316#utm_medium=selfpromo&utm_source=euro&utm_campaign=copylink (accessed 08/01/2017). 
22 “Radek Špicar: Některé firmy se bez ruského trhu zkrátka neobjdou,” Euroactiv, February 20, 2015, http://euractiv.cz/rozhovory/obchod-a-export/radek-
spicar-nektere-firmy-se-bez-ruskeho-trhu-zkratka-neobejdou-012477/#sthash.XBYNbKzq.dpuf (accessed 08/01/2017).
23 Václav, Trejbal, “Vliv rusko-ukrajinského konfliktu na ekonomické vztahy visegrádských zemí a Ruska.”
Czech Republic
When examining the effect of sanctions on the Czech 
economy, one observation cannot go unnoticed: the 
striking imbalance between their anticipated and 
real impacts. Sanctions imposed by the EU and the 
subsequent Russian counter-sanctions initially raised 
concerns not only among some government officials, 
but also among select members of the business 
community. The efficacy of the sanctions was, for 
example, questioned by the President of the Senate 
of the Parliament, Milan Štěch, as well as the current 
Czech President, Miloš Zeman. The primary argument 
was that these actions would hurt the Czech 
economy and negatively influence Czech citizens, 
and might even lead the economy back into a 
recession.16 In addition, business representatives, with 
significant exposure to the Russian market, have, on 
multiple occasions, expressed their discontent about 
possible profit losses and the difficulties presented 
by the need to find new markets.17 The most visibly 
prominent actors with a considerable presence in 
Russia include: Škoda, a major Czech car producer; 
Hamé, a food processing company; or financial group 
PPF that operates on a wide spectrum of market 
segments.18 Thus, a selected number of actors raised 
their doubts whether benefits of these restrictive 
measures will outweigh potential costs. 
According to the official government document 
assessing the impacts of the EU-related sanctions 
(August, 2014), it was estimated that the EU sanctions 
could inflict direct losses worth 81,4 million euro and 
threaten some 700 jobs. Russian counter-sanctions, 
on the other hand, were presumably endangering 
sales worth 11,1 million euro and 130 jobs until the 
end of 2014.19 Moreover, representatives of the trade 
unions warned against the possible inaccuracy of 
these numbers, and insisted that the sanctions could 
be much more disastrous in the long-term. 
Nevertheless, the real impact of the sanctions 
on the Czech economy remains well below the 
alarming estimates.20 The sharp decline in bilateral 
trade between Russia and the Czech Republic was 
hardly noticed in terms of the overall economic state. 
Instead, it was the fall of the rouble, accompanied by 
other structural difficulties confronting the Russian 
economy that contributed considerably to the drop 
in trade figures.21 The sanctions regime created an 
atmosphere of uncertainty because it was not known 
whether these trade restrictions would continue. But, 
due to the structure of Czech exports to Russia, and 
together with governmental initiatives designed 
to support affected exporters, the real impact was 
rather limited. 
Since machinery tools represent the majority of 
Czech exports to Russia, sanctions caused significant 
concerns among industrialists in this particular 
sector, since it remained unclear which machinery 
products would be specified under the sanctioned 
category of dual-use goods. Czech officials, however, 
managed to negotiate an amendment proposing 
that the sanctions would not apply to certain types 
of machine-based tools, and thus significantly 
limited the sanctions’ negative effects.22 Other items 
subjected to the EU’s sanctions, such as artillery 
or advanced mining technologies, composed only 
marginal shares within Czech exports to Russia.23 As 
a result, after the initial wave of fearful reactions, it 
turned out that only a small segment of the Czech 
industrial export base was directly affected by the 
sanctions regime.
As for agricultural exports, of which less than 2 % 
end up in Russia, counter-sanctions have so far not 
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been relevant to major Czech export commodities, 
namely beer or confectionery. Thus, the value of 
agricultural exports to Russia actually rose during the 
second half of 2014, a period immediately following 
the imposition of Russian counter-sanctions.24 The 
only significant segment directly affected by the 
Russian embargo within the agricultural sector has 
been the milk industry. Losses in this sector were 
estimated to reach up to 7,4 million euro. However, 
such negative effects have been partially avoided 
thanks to support of the national authorities and 
EU incentives. The Czech government, for example, 
started to purchase dried milk for its material reserves 
and worked closely with canteens and food stores in 
order to boost consumption of agricultural products.
Another factor reducing the negative effect of 
sanctions was the localization of production on the 
Russian market. As trade restrictions only applied 
to cross-border trade, some companies decided to 
move their production to Russia. One such case was 
the food processing company Hame, which now 
operates a manufacturing plant in Bogolyubovo 
since 2004. Despite the company’s concerns in the 
initial phase of counter-sanctions, already in 2015 
Hame officials noted that it had not experienced 
any significant profit losses, and that it had even 
extended its Russian-based production.25 A similar 
strategy was conducted by car producer Skoda with 
factories in Kaluga and Nizhny Novgorod, among 
others. 
One of the ways in which companies minimized 
losses was also the reorientation of goods towards 
other markets. To give one example, the Czech dairy 
producer, Madeta repackaged its cheese products 
and sold them on the domestic market; the financial 
company PPF Group made an active effort to diversify 
its portfolio. Even though the company´s net profits 
dropped by 10 % in 2015 due to troubles stemming 
from the Russian market, sanctions have not been 
the main reason behind this drop. The annual 
budget has remained in positive figures thanks to 
investment activities in China, and its overall profit 
has been constantly growing.26 Thus, business entities 
24 “Agrární vývoz do Ruska loni navzdory sankcí rostl,” Zemědělský svaz České republiky, http://www.zscr.cz/clanek/agrarni-vyvoz-do-ruska-loni-navzdory-
embargu-rostl-1019 
25 Kateřina Vokurková, “Hamé už netrápí ruské sankce, hlásí úspěšné pololetí,” Atualne.cz, August 27, 2014, https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/ekonomika/hame-hlasi-
uspesne-pololeti-sankce-nezbrzdi-ani-cely-rok/r~f82642a42dd211e4807c002590604f2e/?redirected=1484913645 (accessed 23/06/2017).
26 “Kellnerova PPF se pochlubila výroční zprávou a úspěšným rokem,” Echo24.cz, August 18, 2016, http://echo24.cz/a/iMYkr/kellnerova-ppf-se-pochlubila-
vyrocni-zpravou-a-uspesnym-rokem (accessed 23/06/2017).
27 “Materiál „Hodnocení dopadů sankcí v rámci ukrajinské krize.“
undertook adjustment strategies in order to limit 
potential losses. 
The imposing of sanctions on Russia has also had 
indirect implications that are not widely known. The 
previous three years have given Russia an impetus 
to undertake and accelerate long-discussed reforms 
concerning the Russian industrial base. These 
efforts are aimed at supporting the localisation of 
production and on reducing reliance on imports.27 
This may lead to a new phase in the Czech-Russian 
mutual trade relations. Companies oriented towards 
the Russian market will either have to establish 
a business presence in the country, or reduce its 
exposure. It is therefore reasonable to expect that in 
such an uncertain environment, and in light of the 
ongoing sanctions, new economic linkages will be 
limited.
Poland
Restrictions imposed in 2014 on the import of 
agricultural and other food products from the EU by 
Russia were not merely a retaliatory measure taken 
in the aftermath of the EU sanctions, they were 
primarily an attempt to raise the political cost of the 
sanctions by targeting an influential interest group. 
Poland was highlighted as one of the major targets of 
such counter-sanctions. Revoked access to a key sales 
market was meant to lead to enormous losses and 
prompt Polish farmers to exert pressure on political 
elites prior to elections, be it local (November 2014), 
presidential (May 2015) or parliamentary (October 
2015).
It is sufficient to review the statistics for 2013–
2015 in order to assess the real damage sustained to 
the agricultural market by these restrictions. In 2013, 
Polish producers sold agri-food in the value of 20,4 
billion euro abroad which constituted 7,1 % of total 
exports. Of this share, sales to Russia amounted to 
1,25 billion euro. Food exports to Russia had dropped 
by 30 % to 880 million euro as a result of sanctions 
a year later whereas the total value of foodstuffs 
exports had increased by 7,1 % rising to 21,9 billion 
euro. An upward trajectory was also observable in 
2015, when the value of food sold abroad increased by 
7,7 % rising to 22,9 billion euro (18,8 billion euro worth 
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of foodstuffs were sold to the EU), which happened 
despite plummeting sales to Russia in the value of 
398 million euro (a drop of 55 % in 2014). The value 
of Polish exports rose in 2016 by 1,2 % whereas sales 
to Russia fell again by 5,5 % to 320 million euro. The 
share of the Eastern neighbor in revenue from the 
export of agri-food products fell to 1,3 %. According 
to the ranking of recipient countries, Russia slipped 
from 14th to 16th place in 2016. It is noteworthy that 
Polish exports to Belarus after three years of decline 
grew in 2016 from 223 million euro to 321 million 
euro28. In conclusion, the Polish agri-food sector 
managed to successfully offset losses brought on by 
Russian sanctions not only due to a greater presence 
in the EU, but also in other markets.
However, one should not dismiss the losses 
incurred by certain sectors and producers largely 
dependent on Russian consumers. Poland recorded 
a drop in the volume and value of fruit exports (by 12 
% and 2 % respectively) in 2015,29 for example. Apple 
exports suffered in particular (a fall of 19 % both in 
volume and value). A drop in revenues from sales of 
dairy products (a fall of 15 %)30 was accompanied by 
a slight increase in volume, which indicates not only 
did the impact of the embargo, but also unfavorable 
economic conditions. Restrictions introduced by 
Russia therefore did hit certain quarters of the agri-
food sector. Still, the damage was minimal compared 
to both the intentions behind them and the expert 
forecasts, which had it that significant losses were 
afoot.
The sanctions serve to invalidate a long-held 
hypothesis: that the fate of Polish food producers 
largely depended on the Russian market. The 
sanctions have naturally hampered the activities 
of numerous Polish companies. Some businesses 
– especially those with a lack of diversified sales 
markets – have not coped well with the challenge. 
They have failed to redirect the export of apples, 
pears, pork and cheese to other markets. However, 
EU compensation, governmental support provided 
to businesses searching for customers in East Asia, 
the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the 
adjustment of export strategies to unfavorable 
political and market conditions (which is of the 
utmost importance) have enabled not just the 
28 “Yearbook of Foreign Trade Statistics 2016,” Central Statistical Office of Poland, October 24, 2016, https://stat.gov.pl/en/topics/statistical-yearbooks/statistical-
yearbooks/yearbook-of-foreign-trade-statistics-2016,9,10.html (accessed 30/04/2017).
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
survival of, but namely an increase in positive export 
dynamics by Polish businesses.
Assumptions behind Russian counter-sanctions 
proved to be wrong, and the policy derived from 
them brought about results which were not intended. 
The Polish agri-food sector coped quite well with 
the embargo and hence, demands to change 
policies regarding Russia have so far not entered the 
mainstream agenda in Poland. The trade restrictions 
imposed by Russia were not the first during the last 
decade, and they have merely strengthened various 
Polish entrepreneurs’ conviction concerning the 
necessity to diversify exports, given the high-risk 
related to the excessive dependence on the unstable 
Russian market. Aside from that, Russian counter-
sanctions have prompted greater activity in non-EU 
markets.
Although restrictions have brought about serious 
losses for some Polish producers, they have also 
induced measures of adjustment. If further developed, 
these measures will have long-term positive effects. 
A state with a differentiated export profile and a 
diversified sales market is less susceptible to troubled 
relations with an unpredictable partner.
To conclude, the Polish economy has been only 
slightly affected by EU sanctions against Russia 
and Russian counter-sanctions. Other factors have 
determined the dynamics of foreign trade and 
economic relations. Polish losses due to reciprocal 
restrictions can largely be attributed to sectors, or 
even producers, whose composition of trade partners 
was insufficiently diversified, preventing them from 
switching to other markets quickly. Nevertheless, 
Polish exporters did undertake effective measures 
aimed at adaptation in the majority of cases.
Hungary
The introduction of sanctions in 2014 was politically 
unwelcome in Hungary. The government opposed 
the sanction regime as it wanted to keep the security 
challenge on the political level only. Budapest 
increasingly strived for opening up new Eastern 
trade opportunities since 2012. Thus the Ukrainian 
crisis ushered in a period of a major trouble in the 
bilateral relations with Russia. It put the Hungarian 
government in an uncomfortable situation: it had 
already engaged with Russia on several matters 
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such as energy, while the international security and 
political environment considerably limited these 
ambitions, and forced the foreign policy to launch its 
seesaw manoeuvring.
Despite this generally negative attitude towards 
sanctions, Hungary could hardly identify any 
particular sectors where its economic interests would 
have been hit directly by the sanctions. Negative 
consequences have mainly been felt as a result of the 
overall impact on the Russian economy – the fall in 
demand and the exchange rate volatility – rather than 
through the export of a specific product, or service 
bans. Much of the rhetoric surrounding the negative 
impacts of the sanctions regime refers to the Russian 
agricultural counter-sanctions, where producers have 
indeed suffered losses, even if these are minuscule 
compared to decreases in other sectors.
It is difficult to give an estimate for the full 
impact of sanctions on exports. Due to complex 
multinational value chains and the deep integration 
of Hungarian assembly lines into the European 
production processes, Hungarian producers often 
contributed to end products, which were then re-
exported to Russia from other countries. Re-exports 
were also pivotal in the food and agricultural 
industries. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that 
the total decline was considerably larger than 
those suggested by the bilateral trade statistics. 
Nonetheless, even accounting for this potentially 
broader impact, there would hardly be any loss of 
impetus in the overall Hungarian export dynamics to 
be seen between 2013–15. Total exports grew by 11,3 
% in those two years, even if extra-EU exports slightly 
fell by 7,7 %.
It is also impossible to assess the specific impacts 
of numerous factors on export dynamics. The 
direct consequences of the sanctions and the 
Russian agricultural counter-sanctions in particular 
were certainly not the main factors from the 
macroeconomic point of view. Products related to 
investments, durable goods, and those that could 
be substituted domestically, suffered the biggest 
setbacks. This could be the result of the exchange 
31 “Jelentés a külkereskedelem teljesítményéről,” Central Bureau for Statistics, July 2016, https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/kulker/kulker15.pdf 
(accessed 22/01/2017).
32 Elisabeth Christen et al. “Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftssanktionen der EU und Russlands auf Wertschöpfung und Beschäftigung in Österreich und der EU,” 
WIFO , December 2016, http://www.wifo.ac.at/wwa/pubid/59227 (accessed 25/02/2017).
33 Gergely Szakacs, “Europe ‘shot itself in foot’ with Russia sanctions: Hungary PM,” Reuters, August 14, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-
sanctions-hungary-idUSKBN0GF0ES20140815 (accessed 25/11/2016).
34 “Hungarian PM: EU sanctions more damaging to the West,” Deutche Welle, August 15, 2014, http://www.dw.com/en/hungarian-pm-eu-sanctions-more-
damaging-to-the-west/a-17857444 (accessed 25/01/2016).
35 “Венгрия потеряла 6,5 миллиарда долларов из-за антироссийских санкций,“ RIA Novosti, January 24, 2016, https://ria.ru/economy/20170124/1486323337.
html (accessed 25/01/2016).
rate and aggregate demand effects, rather than the 
potential implications of administrative export bans. 
Furthermore, adaptation to the new situation and the 
redirection of exports to other markets were relatively 
successful in some cases. To give an example, in the 
case of pharmaceuticals the new production lines 
were utilized despite the heavy losses on the Russian 
market.31 Hence, sanctions as such could hardly have 
a large impact, especially when combined with 
adjustments from the business side. 
According to the Austrian Institute for Economic 
Research, sanctions were responsible for 40 % of the 
total trade losses in EU28 for the period of 2014–15. In 
their model, Hungary lost 562,5 million euro in 2015 
due to the overall effect of all composite elements 
of the sanctions. This is much less than in the Czech 
Republic (1211,2 million euro) or Poland (1727,8 million 
euro).32 All these numbers suggest that Hungary has 
coped with the sanctions marginally better than its 
Visegrad partners. The implications of the sanctions 
are even weaker in the Hungarian investment field.
The situation and these calculations are in sharp 
contrast with the government’s rhetoric. The sanctions 
have been criticized from their onset and characterized 
as useless and/or harmful by the Hungarian cabinet. 
Prime Minister Viktor Orbán publicly advocated the 
separation of politics from the economy, and called for 
the abolition of the sanctions regime.33 Simultaneously, 
the government estimated that agriculture would 
suffer an annual 80 million euro loss incurred by the 
sanctions.34 In January, 2017, Foreign Minister Péter 
Szíjjártó estimated the Hungarian losses from mutual 
sanctions at 6,5 billion dollars in the last three years.35 
By mid-2017, the government declared its opposition 
to the sanction regime, but expressed its reluctance 
to veto their prolongation alone in the Council. For this 
reason, there is asymmetry between the proclamations 
and actual data. 
The issue of sanctions is not the primary topic on 
the political landscape. The Russia-friendly radical 
right-wing party Jobbik, naturally opposes even the 
political condemnation of Russia. It recognizes the 
Crimean referendum and the annexation of Crimea, 
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and ignores the Russian activity in the Eastern 
Ukraine conflict. The left-wing opposition parties 
offer a broad range of criticism towards Russia, and 
support the sanction regime with varying intensity.
Slovakia
In the past couple of years, while always maintaining 
the EU unity, Slovakia has been adopting a pragmatic 
approach towards Russia. The renewal of relations 
with Russia, primarily based on a mutually beneficial 
economic cooperation, was one of the main priorities 
of Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico’s governments 
(2006–2010, 2012–2016, 2016–present). At the same 
time, Fico presented himself as a pro-European 
leader. It is this capacity to maintain a balanced, 
multi-layered relationship with various partners that 
has been labelled as Fico’s “multivectoralism” by 
Juraj Marušiak.36 After the Russian aggression against 
the Ukraine and the consequent implementation 
of sanctions against Russia by the EU, the dual-track 
policy of the Slovak government has not changed 
dramatically. Fico continued being what Mark 
Leonard and Nicu Popescu call a “friendly pragmatist,” 
and kept good relations with both sides.
In line with this approach, Slovakia’s main foreign 
policy goal in Russia has been to avoid confrontation 
and to maintain close relations. Consequently, 
stressing the importance of material linkages 
between Slovakia and Russia has become the main 
justification for the strong critique of the sanctions 
that were enacted. The terms “suicidal” and “useless” 
have regularly been used by Prime Minister Fico. Yet, 
such claims have not proven to be substantiated.
Even though the sanctions (combined with the 
economic crisis in Russia) had a largely negative 
impact on bilateral trade between Slovakia and 
Russia, they did not have an enormous effect on the 
Slovak economy as such. Slovak exports continued 
to grow, and so did its gross domestic product. Even 
exports in the crucial category of machinery tools 
and transport equipments (SITC 7) increased – mainly 
because the producers could compensate for the 
loss of the Russian market by selling their products 
to other EU member states. One example is the car 
36 Juraj Marusiak, “Slovakia’s Eastern Policy – from the Trojan Horse of Russia to Eastern Multivectoralism,” Internaitonal Issues & Slovak Foreign Policy Affairs (21): 
2013.
37 “Export Kia Motors Slovakia do Ruska klesol v 1. polroku o polovicu,” TASR, July 29, 2016, http://www.teraz.sk/ekonomika/export-kia-motors-slovakia-do-
ruska-kles/209287-clanok.html (accessed 08/05/2017).
38 “Fico na samite EÚ označil sankcie voči Rusku za nezmyselné a nefunkčné,“ TA3 http://www.ta3.com/clanok/1093001/sankcie-voci-rusku-su-nezmyselne-a-
nefunguju-povedal-fico-na-summite-unie.html (accessed 08/05/2017).
39 Alexander Duleba, “Slovakia: Ambiguity in Action,” in Action in A Region Disunited? Central European Responses to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis (Europe Policy 
Paper, 2015).
40 Dalibor Rohac, “Putin’s best EU friends,” Politico, June 16, 2015, http://www.politico.eu/article/putin-friends-renzi-tsipras/ (accessed 15/02/2017).
production of Kia Motors Slovakia. Kia’s exports to 
Russia declined by half to 7 % in the first quarter of 
2016 in comparison with 2015. However, this “loss” 
was compensated by exporting vehicles to other 
European countries. Kia is currently shipping 15 % of 
its production to the Great Britain, 9 % to Germany, 
and there are talks in place with multiple countries in 
South Europe.37
A plausible explanation for the above mentioned 
criticisms of sanctions against Russia is the intention 
to bolster domestic support for the Slovakian Prime 
Minister by targeting such rhetoric at the domestic 
audience. This approach was crucial for Fico before 
the General election in March 2016. But even after that, 
his criticisms of the sanctions continued as can be 
seen during the Bratislava Summit in September, 2016. 
This was done partly in response to public grievances, 
but he also hoped that in exchange, Russia would 
support Miroslav Lajcak, at that time the candidate 
for the UN Secretary General. But there is yet another 
possible explanation. Being “Putin-friendly” may 
guarantee an advantageous contract with Gazprom, 
and cheap gas is important for Fico’s “social” policies. 
It also enables him to lobby Moscow for securing 
Slovakia’s position as a strategic gas transit country. 
Nonetheless, despite the rhetoric that Fico 
adopted when speaking of sanctions, his government 
has so far approved all of the EU’s restrictive measures 
against Russia and promised to always support the 
EU’s unitary position.38 Moreover, Fico’s government 
has been stressing the importance of Slovakia’s 
involvement in helping Ukraine. Whether it was by a 
reverse flow of gas, humanitarian and development 
aid, or the transfer of political experience,39 for 
the current government it is desirable to support 
the democratic change in the Eastern Partnership 
countries and to lead them to European integration. 
However, these attempts are clashing with a 
pragmatic cooperation with Russia. As Dalibor Roháč 
puts it, Slovakia “has been trying to have it both ways, 
giving a lukewarm approval to the EU’s consensus 
position on sanctions, and then complaining about it 
bitterly at home, and in Moscow.”40
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INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE PROMOTION OF TRADE 
WITH RUSSIA – BEFORE AND AFTER UKRAINE
Czech Republic
Taking advantage of favourable trade dynamics, new 
platforms for cooperation had been established 
since 2004. Among the most common institutional 
mechanisms designed for the development of foreign 
trade is the Chamber of Commerce, the Czech export 
bank (CEB), the Export Guarantee and Insurance 
Corporation (EGAP) or the agency CzechTrade. In the 
case of EGAP and CEB, projects in Russia represent 
roughly 30 % of their portfolio and therefore receive 
a disproportionate attention. In the past couple of 
years, several of their projects in Russia have incurred 
losses and caused severe financial problems for both 
companies. Specific actors, however, exist to support 
trade linkages with Russia. These include the Czech-
Russian Intergovernmental Commission on Economic, 
Industrial, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation, and 
two chambers created by private entrepreneurs – the 
Chamber of Trade and Industry for CIS countries, and 
the Russian-Czech Mixed Chamber of Trade. To some 
extent the crisis in Ukraine and worsening relations 
between the EU and Russia affected the work of 
these institutions. 
The Czech-Russian Intergovernmental Commission 
was created in 2005 and brings together leading 
politicians, civil servants, regional actors, industrialists 
and other business and commerce representatives 
that cover specific projects, and map out both 
medium and long term economic plans. Being 
sometimes described as a key body responsible 
for ’oiling‘ economic ties, it may occasionally make 
strategic decisions, especially at a time when relations 
at the political-diplomatic level may be strained. On a 
bilateral level, a similar platform exists for a number of 
countries, including the US and the most prominent 
EU member states. Composed of specialized working 
groups that focus on specific areas and meet on a 
regular basis throughout the year, the commission 
convened on a yearly basis until 2012.
In November 2013, as the former Ukrainian 
President Yanukovich declined to sign the EU 
Association Agreement, the commission was meant 
to convene its planned session, however, it was 
postponed until March 2014 at the last minute. 
After the annexation of Crimea it was informally 
agreed among the EU member countries that no 
regular intergovernmental meetings with Russian 
representatives shall take place. The meeting was 
once again postponed, and another possible date 
was planned for March 2015. But different parts of the 
government appeared to have conflicting priorities, 
which demonstrated a certain lack of coherence when 
it came to adhering to the EU’s informal agreements. 
While the former Minister for Industry and Trade, Jan 
Mládek, who is the commission’s gestor, was in favour 
of the meeting in light of a number of unresolved 
issues pending, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found 
the planned timing inappropriate. 
Regardless of the informal agreement, after a 
three year break the intergovernmental commission 
convened in March 2016 and again in May 2017. The 
Czech MFA seemed to have overlooked its initial 
objections, signalling a growing pragmatism 
and gradual stabilization of the Czech-Russian 
relationship, at least in the economic domain. 
In an effort to offset the decrease in export 
revenue, the Ministry of Industry and Trade through 
its agency CzechTrade promoted greater cooperation 
with regions in Russia, especially in the Sverdlovsk 
oblast, Samara oblast and Krasnoyarsk krai. This 
scheme was realized with active help from the 
Chamber of Trade and Industry for Commonwealth 
of Independent States (CIS Chamber). Established 
in 1997 as a non-governmental and non-profit 
entity, its mission is to identify potential business 
opportunities. By providing support in establishing 
contacts in particular countries, and with Russia 
representing a lucrative market for a series of Czech 
businesses, deteriorating relations since 2014 had a 
negative effect on this body as well. Initially, high-
level government trips that were often accompanied 
by business representatives were no longer allowed, 
and thus greater interaction with the regions became 
a potential compromise for both businesses and 
government officials. 
One platform of a slightly different nature is the 
Russian-Czech Mixed Chamber of Trade. In 2012, a 
group of Russian and Czech companies (the gas 
company Vemex, the oil firm Lukoil Czech Republic, 
Sberbank, and the First Czech-Russian Bank were 
among the founding members) established this 
chamber with the objective of “representing 
and protecting the interests of Russian investors 
operating in the Czech market, and integrating 
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Russian businesses within the Czech business 
community.”41 Its Chairman is Vladimir Ermakov, who 
was, until recently, the Chief Executive Officer of 
Gazprom-controlled Vemex. The Chamber organizes 
seminars or business trips for companies interested in 
expanding its business in Russia and in 2014 it opened 
its representation office in Moscow. In addition it is 
known for lobbying for the Czech-Russian consortium 
MIR.1200 in Temelín power plant tender. Probably 
within the scope of these activities, it attempted 
to increase its visibility by organization of cultural 
events, some of which took place under auspices of 
the President Miloš Zeman. In June 2016, the Chamber 
made itself again visible as it brought a request to 
the government not to prolong the sanctions regime 
during the EU summit. Even though the government 
left the request without reaction and supported the 
prolonging of sanctions, this case illustrates that 
these purportedly economic oriented bodies often 
advance their own political agenda. If they manage 
to develop close connections to important political 
figures, they gain significant potential to influence 
decision-making.
Poland 
The key official platform of communication for 
both sides is the Polish-Russian Intergovernmental 
Commission for Economic Cooperation, set up in 
2005 to discuss a wide range of business interactions. 
There are also other bodies, such as the Permanent 
Committee for Transport, the Joint Commission for 
Fisheries, or the Bilateral Commission for Regional 
Cooperation. There are also two organizations to 
specifically support cooperation between companies: 
the Polish-Russian Chamber of Commerce and the 
Poland-Russia Business Council (both set up to 
represent interests of the companies in discussions 
with the governments).
The Polish-Russian Intergovernmental Commission 
for Economic Cooperation consists of several working 
groups responsible for specific domains, such as 
transport, trade and investments, energy, tourism, 
military and technical cooperation, agriculture and 
customs. The body was devoted to both assessing 
opportunities and managing recurring crises. There 
were six sessions, with the last one organized in 
September 2013. Since then, the Commission has 
not convened which was clearly a direct result of 
41 “Základní informace,” Official website of the Russian-Czech Mixed Chamber of Trade, http://www.rckomora.eu/cz/komora/zakladni_informace/ (accessed 
10/05/2017).
42 “Polska i Rosja podpisały porozumienie o przewozów towarowych,” Polska Agencja Prasowa, November 9, 2016, http://www.pap.pl/aktualnosci/
news,700367,polska-i-rosja-podpisaly-porozumienie-ws-samochodowych-przewozow-towarowych.html (accessed 10/06/2017).
growing tensions after Russian aggression against 
Ukraine, and the imposition of sanctions. Existing and 
emerging bilateral problems began to be managed 
mainly through bilateral meetings of the respective 
ministers or their representatives in the framework 
of the aforementioned working groups (on customs, 
trans-border cooperation and veterinary issues). For 
example, in November 2016, the Polish–Russian Joint 
Commission for International Road Transport met in 
Cracow to solve the dispute that arose in 2016 with 
respect to new Russian regulations heavily limiting 
permits for Polish freight companies. Both sides 
reached a consensus about a number of permits 
for 2017.42 It shows that the Ukraine crisis had a clear 
effect on the work of institutional mechanisms.
Given the limited scope of Polish-Russian trade 
and investment relations, and their significant 
decrease after 2014, so far, there has not been a 
serious incentive to return to a comprehensive, 
institutional mechanism for cooperation. Initially, 
political costs related to such a move prevailed over 
would-be economic benefits. Thus, both countries 
started to work in “crisis management mode” based 
on ad hoc measures. Only in late 2016 at the Sankt 
Petersburg Economic Forum did the Polish Deputy 
Minister for Development meet with his Russian 
counterpart to discuss a framework for cooperation. 
The Russian representative proposed resuming 
the Intergovernmental Commission, which was 
warmly welcomed. The Polish government reacted 
positively, though the progress has been modest 
with no meeting scheduled thus far. Even if the 
Commission restarts its functioning, it is unlikely that 
any qualitative changes will develop until the political 
conflict between the West and Russia is somehow 
fixed. 
Hungary
Hungarian–Russian economic relations have changed 
remarkably since 2010. As in many other CEE countries, 
the Joint Economic Committee is the highest 
bureaucratic coordination level, established in the 
early 1990s. This bilateral, inter-ministerial body is 
primarily responsible for the coordination between 
different authorities and ministries, monitoring the 
relational trends and the setting of agendas for 
high-level meetings, and it constitutes the highest 
preparatory level for decision-making. It is a broad 
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structure with many sectoral subcommittees, but 
without any staff or decision-making powers. 
Nonetheless, the administrative levels gradually 
lost their importance, and their functions were then 
taken over by a system of political messengers and 
clienteles. In June 2012, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán 
nominated his close confidant, Péter Szíjjártó to 
the position of State Secretary for Foreign Affairs 
and External Economic Relations at the Prime 
Minister’s Office. In practice, these positions made 
him responsible for the foreign economic ties 
with countries outside the EU, an eminent policy 
field of the government under the label “Eastern 
opening.” His nomination was also comprised of a 
centralization effort. In this new setting, most of the 
activities related to high-level decision-making were 
concentrated in the Prime Minister’s Office, with a 
lesser involvement of ministerial levels. After Viktor 
Orbán’s re-election in 2014, Péter Szíjjártó took over 
the foreign minister’s position. 
Annual bilateral meetings, usually held in January 
or early February, between Viktor Orbán and Vladimir 
Putin have become the norm of Hungarian-Russian 
relations since 2010. Putin’s visit to Budapest in 
February 2015 is the most noteworthy from this list. 
Symbolic steps as such fit well into Viktor Orbán’s 
image of sovereign national foreign policy and as an 
alternative to Western mainstream politics. On the 
public level, statements and press conferences show 
a strong quid pro quo logic; both leaders avoid topics 
which are sensitive for them. Hardly anything is to be 
known about the channelization of interests into this 
system. It is reasonable to assume that these relations 
are predominantly made by politicians, rather than 
businessmen. The construction, infrastructural, and 
energy sectors dominate the economic agenda, often 
represented by state-owned enterprises or little-
known smaller companies.
Slovakia
Since the establishment of the independent Slovak 
Republic, the key institution for articulating the 
economic interests of Slovakia and Russia in bilateral 
trade was the Intergovernmental Commission for 
Economic and Trade Cooperation. The Commission 
was particularly popular during the government of 
Vladimír Mečiár. However, the Mikuláš Dzurinda’s 
government, formed in 1998, tried to demonstrate 
to the West its desire to put Slovakia “back on track” 
43 Vazil Hudak, “ Informácia o priebehu a výsledkoch 17. zasadnutia Medzivládnej komisie pre hospodársku a vedecko-technickú spoluprácu medzi Slovenskou 
republikou a Ruskou federáciou v dňoch 5. – 6. mája 2015 v Bratislave a Návrh vykonávacieho protokolu,” Position paper for government negotiation, 
September 17, 2015.
towards the EU, and on to accession into NATO, which 
meant eliminating the pro-Russian orientation from 
the Meciar era. The aim was then to set up a more 
balanced Eastern policy, seeking, for instance, to 
create closer relations with the countries that are 
now a part of the Eastern Partnership initiative. 
Russia remained a strategic partner in both energy 
security and trade, but Slovakia’s main orientation 
was towards the West. Once Slovakia entered the 
EU, bilateral negotiations were transferred onto the 
EU level and the Commission was dismissed. When 
Fico’s government entered office in 2006, it was one 
of his main priorities to renew previous relations 
with Russia. In terms of economic diplomacy, the 
Intergovernmental Slovak-Russian Committee for 
Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation was 
re-established, followed by the establishment of the 
Slovak-Russian Business Council (2007). 
The 12th session (and the first in this new format) 
of the re-established intergovernmental committee 
was held in Moscow in February 2007. Both sides 
agreed on strengthening and developing bilateral 
cooperation, particularly in the energy sector, and 
agreed to organize regular meetings. The first 
meeting after the sanctions were imposed, the 17th 
session, was supposed to take place in June 2014. 
However, it was postponed to May 2015 (because of 
the implementation of such restrictive measures). 
Slovakia was represented by Lubomír Vážný, the 
Vice-chairman of the Council of the Slovak Republic 
for Investments, and the corresponding Russian 
representative was Denis Manturov, the Minister 
of Trade and Industry. Both parties agreed to 
the development mutual economic cooperation, 
primarily in the energy and industry sectors 
(including armory).43 The 17th session seemed to 
lift both parties’ spirits, with both sides expressing 
a keen interest in deepening the economic 
cooperation. However, neither side brought up 
the issue of sanctions. Considering the continuous 
renewal of the restrictive measures and the economic 
crisis that Russia is facing, the optimism experienced 
in this meeting may no longer be reflected in Slovak-
Russian relations. 
The Slovak-Russian Business Council is a civic 
organization connecting and supporting business 
representatives, as well as private and public 
organizations in the Slovak Republic and in the 
Russian Federation. The council meets annually 
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with its Russian counterpart.44 The Council also took 
part in the 17th session of the Intergovernmental 
SK-RU Committee, where it organized the Slovak-
Russian Business Forum. According to the Ministry of 
Economy of the Slovak Republic, one of the results 
was the foundation of the working group focused 
on the recognition of the prospective Slovak-Russian 
44 “O nás,” Official website of the Slovak-Russian Business Council, http://www.srpr.sk/o-nas/ (accessed 20/05/2017).
projects, in addition to garnering financial support. 
These two aspects are the most critical, and the 
Business Council may help to improve the situation 
and, eventually, to contribute further to the 
development of bilateral trade.
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RUSSIA’S ROLE IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE VISEGRAD COUNTRIES
45 “Mládek: Nord Stream by se mohl rozšířit, kdyby padla dohoda o zachování ukrajinské cesty,” Euroactive , http://euractiv.cz/clanky/energetika/mladek-nord-
stream-by-se-mohl-rozsirit-kdyby-padla-dohoda-o-zachovani-tranzitu-pres-ukrajinu-013090/
Czech Republic
The Czech Republic’s dependence on Russia as an 
energy provider is significant. Russian gas covers 
almost the entire domestic consumption, and Russian 
oil accounts for some two thirds of Czech oil imports. 
Moreover, Russia positions itself as a vital player in the 
nuclear energy sector. The security risks stemming 
from this excessive reliance has moved up the 
government’s agenda since the 2009 gas crisis. The 
beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014 only deepened 
already existing concerns. 
Part of this debate is correlated to the Nord Stream 
2 project, where the Czech government continues 
to adopt a hesitant position. Officially, it appears to 
acknowledge the role of Ukraine as an important 
transit country and finds it vital to keep this route 
functional, yet, it does not necessarily oppose the 
Nord Stream expansion as clearly as other Visegrad 
countries. This can be partly explained by the fact that 
since the 1990s, the Czech Republic followed a path 
of diversification in terms of both routes and sources. 
In this case, the source of gas will remain the same, 
namely Russia, but an existing pipeline coming from 
the North will increase its volume. Through this lens, if 
the volume of transiting gas via Ukraine decreases in 
the future, the security of supply will nevertheless be 
secured from the North. Furthermore, the vast majority 
of gas supplies crossing the Czech Republic through 
a robust gas infrastructure network is destined for 
foreign customers. The Nord Stream 2 could possibly 
increase incomes from gas transit fees, if the gas 
flowing through it is further transported over Czech 
territory to the South and East – to Austria or Slovakia.
Potential economic benefits stemming from Nord 
Stream 2 might have influenced the Czech government’s 
decision to oppose signing a letter from December 2015, 
addressed to the highest executives of the EU stipulating 
that realization of the Nord Stream 2 project could lead 
to weakening of energy security in Central Europe, as 
well as the EU. The signing of the letter only occurred in 
its “milder version” a few months later in March 2016. In 
an effort to provide an explanation for this decision, the 
former Czech Industry and Trade minister, Jan Mládek, 
noted that the proposed pipeline would translate into 
a significant reduction and possibly even suspension of 
the transit of gas across Ukraine, which could ultimately 
have a considerable impact on its trade and political 
stability.45 For the Czech government, it is imperative 
to have as many gas supply lines as possible in order to 
ensure Czech energy security. As Russian gas provides 
for some two thirds of the country’s needs, its delivery 
would be maintained preferably through the territory of 
the Ukraine as well as through the Baltic Sea.
Russia additionally occupies a dominant position 
in the nuclear energy dimension, which forms a 
sizeable part of the Czech energy mix, accounting 
for roughly 19 % of the country’s electricity supply. 
Not only are Czech nuclear power plants built using 
mostly Soviet technology, but also the nuclear fuel is 
provided, until at least 2020, by the Russian company 
TVEL, which belongs to the state-owned corporation 
Rosatom. 
In 2009, a tender process at the Temelín power 
plant was launched with the goal to construct 
two additional units. It received bids from three 
candidates, including Rosatom. In order to strengthen 
its bid, the company offered full coverage of the 
project costs through one of its subsidiaries. This was 
hardly able to be matched by any other candidate, 
especially as the other contender, Westinghouse, was 
only able to secure 50% financing from the U.S. Exim 
Bank. Moreover, Rosatom signed a memorandum of 
understanding with over a dozen Czech and Slovak 
companies, through which it offered the chance 
to participate in the construction of other Russian-
designed plants around the world.
With such financing and the presentation of a 
unique opportunity for local companies, Rosatom 
was generally expected to win the tender, but in the 
wake of the Ukraine crisis, involvement in Russia’s 
strategic state-owned company was likely judged too 
controversial for the Czech government. In April 2014, 
the tender process was cancelled altogether after 
government’s decision not to provide any guarantees 
to the project.
Reflecting long-term plans to increase the 
percentage of nuclear energy in the country’s energy 
mix and reduce its dependence on coal, the Czech 
Republic began to indicate its preparedness to build 
additional units at its second power plant in Dukovany 
in 2015. In that respect, it is important to note that 
both current reactor units at Dukovany are nearing 
the end of their service life. In order to maintain the 
supply of nuclear energy at the current level, the 
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construction of the additional reactors has to be 
finished by 2035. According to Jan Štuller, the Czech 
government commissionaire for nuclear energy, to 
meet this deadline the method of financing and 
tender process needs to be defined by 2018, with the 
selection of the supplier in realized by 2020.46 The six 
companies expressing interest in the project once 
again also included the state-owned Rosatom. While 
financing is usually a worrying concern in the case of 
nuclear projects, Rosatom’s director, Kirill Komarov, 
suggested that the company could once again provide 
the financial backing. Moreover, he noted that an 
open tender “does not represent the right approach,” 
possibly suggesting that Rosatom would prefer 
intergovernmental contract, which was the case with 
Hungary’s Paks power plant.47 Strikingly, President 
Miloš Zeman expressed a similar opinion during his 
visit to Dukovany in June 2017, stating that he would 
not mind if the state directly awarded the contract 
to Rosatom without a public tender, thus openly 
contradicting the government position on the issue.48
The tender preparations have been initiated 
by the 2013–2017 government. For the final design, 
however, a government formed after the autumn 
2017 parliamentary elections will be responsible. The 
choice of tender procedure will be a critical one: the 
new reactors in Dukovany will still be in service in 
2100 and the selection of their supplier is, therefore, 
a deeply strategic decision. If Rosatom participates 
in the construction, Russia’s leverage in the country 
would significantly increase. 
Poland
The security of Polish energy supply has been a focal 
point of Polish energy policy for many years due to 
Russia’s position of the dominant oil and gas supplier 
(with over 90% and 70% dependence respectively) 
for historical (East-West infrastructure inherited after 
the Soviet bloc), geographical (relative proximity) 
and economic reasons (relatively low prices, though 
in the case of gas, this issue ceased to be valid in 
recent years). What made Polish policy-makers and 
public opinion anxious was a general suspicion that 
Russia might be willing to use its position not only 
46 Robert Břešťan, “Český “pan Jádro”: Nový jaderný blok bychom měli spustit v roce 2035,” HlídacíPes, October 4, 2016, http://hlidacipes.org/cesky-pan-jadro-
novy-jaderny-blok-bychom-meli-spustit-v-roce-2035/ (accessed 14/07/2017).
47 Jan Brož, “Tendr na jaderné bloky není efektivní. Je to ale možnost, říká šéf Rosatomu,” iDnes.cz, February 4, 2017, http://ekonomika.idnes.cz/kirill-komarov-
rosatom-rozhovor-jaderne-reaktory-dostavba-pq0-/ekonomika.aspx?c=A170130_2302287_ekonomika_rts (accessed 30/06/2017).
48 “Nebyl bych proti zadání Rusům, řekl Zeman o rozšiřování Dukovan,” iDnes.cz, June 29, 2017, https://jihlava.idnes.cz/prezident-milos-zeman-v-jaderne-
elektrarne-dukovany-f9x-/jihlava-zpravy.aspx?c=A170629_151855_jihlava-zpravy_mv (accessed 31/07/2017).
49 Press release of the Polish Gas Transmission Operator Gaz-System, June 6, 2017, http://en.gaz-system.pl/wsparcie-z-ue/transeuropejska-siec-energetyczna-
ten-e/baltic-pipe/ (accessed 04/07/2017).
50 Robbie Gramer, “First U.S. Natural Gas Shipped to Poland,” Foreign Policy, June 8, 2017, http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/08/first-u-s-natural-gas-shipped-to-
poland/ (accessed 04/07/2017).
for commercial gain, but also for political interests. 
Repeated gas crises contributed to those fears, in 
addition to an increased determination to get access 
to new suppliers and routes so as not to be held 
hostage by a third party’s gas disputes any more. The 
conflict in Ukraine triggered Polish attempt to get 
back to the projects abandoned more than a decade 
earlier, such as the Baltic Pipe.49
An almost total reliance on oil has not been 
securitized as much as a dependence on gas, because 
of a lower level of vulnerability to disruption for the 
former. An oil terminal located in Gdansk allows 
Poland to reach other potential suppliers all over the 
world, which subsequently can help to supplement, 
or even replace, Russian oil transported through 
the Friendship pipeline. In the case of gas deliveries, 
Poland focused its energy only on a limited amount 
of infrastructure, which was consequently developed 
in order to ensure contractural and physical security 
through the diversification of its suppliers and regional 
interconnections. The key element of the Polish energy 
security strategy became the LNG terminal. It took 
about ten years to translate an idea from 2005 into 
reality, but in late 2015 the terminal in Świnoujście, 
with an annual capacity of 5 bcm (about 1/3 of the 
Polish demand) became operational and started to 
receive deliveries from Qatar the following year. A 
long-term contract with Qatar was supplemented with 
spot cargos. Quite symbolically, in June 2017 Poland 
received first delivery of LNG from the U.S.50 
Other measures aimed at reducing sensitivity to 
would-be Russian pressure included building and 
planning new inter-connectors between Poland, 
Germany, the Czech Republic and Slovakia and first 
a virtual, then a physical reverse flow on the Yamal-
Europe gas pipeline. Moreover, in 2014, Poland launched 
an Energy Union initiative in the EU, a comprehensive 
action plan to improve EU energy security (the idea was 
taken over by the European Commission later on and 
extended to include other components of EU energy 
policy, such as climate action). 
Most of these actions were not directly related to 
recent Russia-Ukraine war since they started much 
earlier. However, the current crisis increased Poland’s 
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determination to further reduce its reliance on the 
East-West axis through the development of the so 
called Northern Gate, currently with the LNG terminal 
(potentially also floating terminals in the more distant 
future). Additionally, the new Baltic Pipe gas pipeline 
would integrate Norwegian gas deposits (through 
Denmark) with Central and South European gas 
markets (and Ukraine). Relatively new, and seemingly 
related to Russian aggression against Ukraine, is 
the resolve to adopt the capability to satisfy Polish 
energy demands with Russian deliveries as an option, 
not a necessity, by the time the current long-term 
contract with Gazprom expires (i.e. by 2022). 
The idea of a Northern Gate, which aims at the 
diversification of suppliers and the transformation 
of Poland into a regional gas hub, collided with 
new Russian efforts (backed by some Western 
companies and cautiously supported by some 
Western governments) to build the Nord Stream 2 (two 
additional pipelines parallel to the already existing 
Baltic route) which would significantly increase the 
Russian presence in Western markets, and render Polish 
projects more difficult, if not impossible, to be realized. 
Unsurprisingly, the Polish government belongs 
to the fiercest critics of the Nord Stream 2, which is 
seen as a clear contradiction with the principles of the 
Energy Union, the security of supply, the solidarity 
clause, and competition. The opposition took 
practical measures when Poland’s anti-monopoly 
watchdog (UOKiK) decided that the planned joint 
venture by Russia’s Gazprom and five European 
companies to build the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline 
could undermine regional competition. This decision 
forced the consortium to change its structure with 
Gazprom as a sole shareholder, with other companies 
(Uniper, OMV, Shell, Engie and Wintershall) 
downgraded as supporters. Obviously, this cannot 
block the whole project but it nevertheless illustrates 
Polish political action with legal tools.
When the European Commission announced at 
the end of October a controversial decision on OPAL, 
in which it practically made available almost its full 
capacity to Gazprom, the Polish government and 
the gas company PGNiG went to the European Court 
of Justice and other German courts and managed to 
temporarily suspend the execution of this decision. 
This suspension was revoked in July 2017 by the ECJ, 
51 “Nord Stream 2: rząd zajął stanowiskiem wobec gazociągu,” Polska Agencja Prasowa, June 6, 2017, http://www.polskieradio.pl/42/3167/Artykul/1773680,Nord-
Stream-2-rzad-zajal-stanowiskiem-wobec-gazociagu (accessed 04/07/2017).
52 “A Magyar Villamosenergia-Rendszer (VER) 2012. Évi Statisztikai Adatai [Statistical Data of the Hungarian Power System 2012],” MEKH, http://www.mavir.hu/
documents/10258/154394509/a_magyar_villamosenergia_rendszer_2012_evi_statisztikai_adatai.pdf/b1fcbe6e-ed81-42bc-bf05-569aec2cfaa3 (accessed 
14/11/2014).
but the case is pending with a verdict expected 
in 2019, which might have profound impact on EU 
energy policy and Russian gas ambitions in the EU. 
From the Polish perspective, it is simply impossible to 
reconcile the EC interpretation of security of supply 
and competitiveness as explained in the decision, 
with repeated calls for diversification and regional 
integration, let alone in a broader political, security and 
military context. In June 2017, the Polish government 
officially adopted a position towards Nord Stream 2, 
though the document is classified. However, Polish 
officials indicated that Nord Stream 2 should not be 
built, since it would result in an increase of Central 
Europe’s dependence on a single supplier. They also 
announced taking legal and political measures to 
convince their other EU partners that the project poses 
significant risks for the region as a whole.51
Hungary
By the time of the Ukrainian crisis and the imposing of 
sanctions, Hungary engaged Russia in some delicate 
energy matters. The two most noteworthy elements 
are the gas supply relations and the nuclear power 
plant Paks 2 construction project. Gas export relations 
became more politicized due to the government’s 
nationalization efforts. Foreign companies, like E.ON, 
GDF, RWE were ousted by 2015 and gas negotiations 
were brought under political control. Gazprom may 
have also contributed to Viktor Orbán’s populist 
utility rate cuts by decreasing the import prices in the 
time of the 2014 electoral campaign.
The other major factor was the agreement on 
the construction of two new 1200 MW nuclear 
blocs by 2025–2027. In 2012, the existing nuclear 
blocs generated 45,9  % of the gross electrical 
power produced in Hungary.52 Notwithstanding 
such a high percentage, these units will have to 
be decommissioned in the 2030s, raising the issue 
of their substitution. The new units, contracted in 
2014, shall substitute the old ones and come online 
by the mid 2020s. These contractual relations raise 
many sensitive issues and constitute a turnaround in 
Hungary’s diversification efforts.
The case of Nord Stream 2 also shows signs of a dual-
track approach. Hungary signed the letter with seven 
other East European countries, objecting the Nord 
Stream 2 project supposedly for energy security reasons 
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in March 2016.53 Nonetheless, the Hungarian protest 
was a bit oxymoronic in light of Budapest’s strenuous 
efforts to construct a South Stream a couple of years 
ago. There was hardly any evidence that Hungary’s 
position had changed since that time. Foreign Minister 
Péter Szíjjártó publicly compared the South Stream to 
the Nord Stream, hinting at a potential double standard 
in the EU’s approach to the two pipelines.54 Thus, the 
Hungarian opposition to Nord Stream was rather a 
tactical move than a matter of true security concern. 
Budapest expressed its dissatisfaction with the lost 
opportunities on the Southern flank and did not want 
to lose these opportunities by granting an easy go to 
the German pipeline.
The wish to preserve a considerable Russian 
nexus in the energy field is not purely political. For 
many corporate stakeholders, Russian ties are the 
main instrument for preserving their market share 
or sheer sectoral existence. For the nuclear industry, 
the renewal of the capacities beyond the 2030s is a 
matter of survival, and hardly anyone can offer better 
terms for such a construction than the Russians. For 
the national energy champion, the power company 
MVM Group, the alternative to the LTSC would be 
a more liberalized, and fragmented national gas 
trading landscape, accompanied with a heavy 
drop of its market share. Thus, MVM is interested 
in maintaining the current patterns of gas imports 
and it is in its eminent interests to keep the relations 
heavily politicized. For Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, 
the EU regulations regarding the gas and electricity 
markets hide imminent threats to his utility rate cut 
efforts, thus his preferences on the Russian monopoly 
provide an important excuse. These sectoral 
considerations point towards further maintenance 
of the current status quo. The Russian “conservative” 
view on the future of the European energy markets 
is relatively popular among industrial stakeholders, 
strengthening the local ideological underpinnings. 
Unlike before 2009, choosing Russia is not simply a 
geopolitical or security matter, but often represents 
an option for the traditional model of energy markets 
vis-à-vis European trends.
53 Andrius Sytas, “EU leaders sign letter objecting to Nord Stream-2 gas link,” Reuters, March 16, 2016, http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-eu-energy-nordstream-
idUKKCN0WI1YV (accessed 30/01/2017).
54 “Hungary opposes Nord Stream II, speaks of negative impact on Eastern Europe,” Natural Gas World, October 22, 2015, http://www.naturalgasworld.com/
hungary-opposes-nord-stream-ii-speaks-of-negative-impact-on-east-europe-25989 (accessed 30/01/2017).
55 “Slovak Republic: Energy System Overview,” IEA, https://www.iea.org/media/countries/SlovakRepublic.pdf (accessed 18/07/2017).
56 Andrej Nosko and Peter Ševce, “The Evolution of Energy Security in the Slovak Republic,” Journal of Energy Security (2010), http://www.ensec.org/index.
php?option=com_content&view=article&id=262:the-evolution-of-energy-security – in-the-slovak-republic&catid=110:energysecuritycontent&Itemid=366 
(accessed 18/07/2017).
Slovakia
Slovakia is one of the EU countries which is most 
dependent on external energy supplies, as it imports 
almost 90  % of its primary energy resources. In 
Slovakia, they come from a single supplier – the 
Russian Federation, especially when it comes to the 
crude oil and natural gas.55 The gas crisis of January 
2009 demonstrated Slovakia’s energy vulnerability 
in full scope when the gas supplies were cut off due 
to the Russian-Ukrainian dispute over gas prices. 
Because of this unexpected disruption, Slovakia, as 
both a recipient and as the second largest transit 
country of Russian gas to Europe (after Ukraine), 
suffered from enormous economic damages. 
The loss was estimated at 1 billion euro over the 
duration of the whole crisis, which led to the gas-
related recession and a 1–1,5% decrease in GDP.56 
This experience forced the Slovak government to 
reevaluate its previously reluctant attitude towards 
the diversification of natural gas resources to enhance 
energy security as well as market competition. 
Even though Slovakia secured other avenues for 
its gas supplies after the 2009 crisis (thanks to the 
modernization of gas connections on the border with 
Austria and the Czech Republic, and due to the current 
North-South Corridor project), it still purchases almost 
all the gas it consumes from Gazprom. One of the 
main reasons for this is that Russian gas is the cheapest 
one. According to the Russian news agency TASS, the 
price for gas which Slovakia paid to Gazprom in 2014 
was one of the lowest in the EU – the average price of 
Russian gas supplied to clients in the EU and in Turkey 
was higher by 33 dollars per 1000 m3 than what Slovakia 
paid (308 dollars per 1000 cubic meters). Thus, it can 
be observed that Slovakia has a very advantageous 
contract with Gazprom. However, as the crisis of 2009 
indicated, price cannot be the one and only factor 
when choosing a supplier in such a crucial field as an 
energy sector. And in 2014/2015 Russia demonstrated, 
once again, that it is not a reliable partner. 
In September 2014, Bratislava started Central 
Europe’s largest gas reverse (70  % of the total supply 
from Europe), allowing gas to be sent to Ukraine, 
thereby undermining the interests of Gazprom. In 
response to this, Russia reduced the volume of gas 
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supplied to Slovakia by nearly half, using the need 
to replenish its stock as a pretext. These retaliatory 
measures, which lasted until March 2015, failed to have 
a negative effect on the Slovak economy. Quite the 
contrary – according to the Ministry of Economy of SR, 
the gas reverse to Ukraine was a “win-win” situation as 
it was a significant help to their eastern neighbor, as 
well as a good source of income for the state budget.57 
Even though this experience did not cause any damage 
to the Slovak economy or their energy security as 
such, it was a very valuable lesson. Firstly, if the official 
narrative was true and there were problems with the 
Siberian gas extraction, in order to secure the stability 
of gas supply it is crucial to find a supplier who does not 
have to face these types of problems. Secondly, if it was 
only part of a political game because of the situation 
in Ukraine, then the situation is even more alarming; it 
is a clear sign that the rational economic interests are 
not a decisive factor for Gazprom or the Kremlin. And a 
country as dependent on external providers as Slovakia 
simply cannot afford gambling with its energy security 
in such a way, even though Slovak gas consumption 
has been continuously decreasing and the alternative 
sources of energy are trending. The current Slovak 
contract with Gazprom is valid until 2028 but it is 
crucial that Slovakia continues the diversification of 
its gas sources, transmission routes, and finds a way 
to maintain its position as a strategic transit country. 
Particularly since Russia backed out of the South 
Stream project, and is now pushing for the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline, the Turkish Stream construction has 
been planned and the transportation of natural gas 
via Ukraine will be stopped after 2019. Fico admitted 
that Slovakia cannot block construction of the Nord 
Stream  2 pipeline.58 The current debate is focusing 
on the issue of European companies which support 
Nord Stream 2 are going against the EU’s interests. 
The US sanctions on companies dealing with Russia 
and a tricky timeline should ease Slovakia’s constantly 
57 Marek Garbarcik, “Informacny material na rokovanie Rady Vlady SR pre podporu exportu a investicii 18.2.2015,” Information material for government 
negotiation, https://www.mzv.sk/documents/10182/11855/Informacny+material+RVPEI+_sankcie+EU+-+RF.pdf/d5399da5-982c-42ac-9cf5-0a2a9e30a36e 
(accessed 10/02/2017).
58 “Fico admits that Slovakia cannot influence Nord Stream 2,” vEnergetike.sk, August 24, 2016, https://venergetike.sk/fico-admits-that-slovakia-cannot-
influence-nord-stream-2/ (accessed 31/07/2017).
59 Georg Zachmann, “Nord Stream 2 can wait,” Bruegel, June 13, 2017, http://bruegel.org/2017/06/nord-stream-2-can-wait/ (accessed 01/07/2017).
60 “Reverzný tok plynu na Ukrajinu je aj dobrým biznisom, tvrdí analytik,“ Teraz, September 26, 2014, http://www.teraz.sk/ekonomika/reverzny-tok-plynu-na-
ukrajinu-biznis/99658-clanok.html (accessed 01/07/2017).
61 “Slovakia nurtures special ties to Russia, despite EU sanctions,” Reuters, May 22, 2014, http://uk.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-slovakia-
idUKL6N0O847Y20140522 (accessed 01/07/2017).
62 “Nord Stream 2: Blíží se Slovensko a Rusko ke smíření?” Euractiv, July 7, 2016, http://euractiv.cz/clanky/energetika/nord-stream-2-blizi-se-slovensko-a-rusko-
ke-smireni-013395/ (accessed 31/07/2017).
narrowing path for a time. Nevertheless, according to 
the Bruegel, it would do more harm than good.59
What Are the Alternatives?
One of the measures securing Slovakia’s position as a 
transit country has been the provision of a reverse flow 
to Ukraine. After the reconstruction of the pipeline 
Vojany-Uzhorod and the start of the gas transmission 
to Ukraine, suppliers bought out the volume of the gas 
export up until 2019. Moreover, the initial investment 
by Eustream, that was necessary for its reconstruction, 
was repaid within a year.60 Overall, the reverse flow to 
Ukraine can be considered a success. 
Another option enabling Slovakia to sustain the 
status of a significant transit country is the Eastring 
gas pipeline project. This pipeline would connect 
Western Europe with Romania and Bulgaria, via 
Slovakia and Hungary, and would also be connected 
to the Turkish Stream. If Eastring and Turkish Stream 
become reality, it would serve to improve the security 
of supplies in Central and South-Eastern Europe. 
However, the fact that Fico has combined the Slovak 
Eastring project and the Russian Turkish Stream 
project undoubtedly served Moscow’s interests, and 
could possibly hamper actions involving the Eastring 
project’s promotion in the EU. As Grigorij Mesežnikov 
suggests: “[Fico] comes from the idea, and it seems 
to be finding some resonance in Slovak society, that 
simply the question of one’s own benefit is more 
important than strategic considerations.”61
For Slovakia, probably the most feared 
development is the gas transport from Russia to 
Europe via Nord Stream 2, as it would cost the state 
budget hundreds of millions of euro. However, even 
then, cooperation is still an option. If this plan was 
realised, Slovakia could transfer gas from the Czech 
Republic to Austria. Moreover, further transfer would 
be possible via Eastring to South-Eastern Europe.62
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CONCLUSION 
Prior to the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, notable 
similarities existed in terms of trade dynamics 
between the Visegrad countries and Russia. These 
positive trade processes began to develop with the 
recovery of the Russian economy after the Russian 
financial crisis of the late 1990s. As a result, trade 
turnover demonstrated an upward trajectory, with 
one watershed following the financial crisis in 
2008. Accompanied by booming energy prices and 
Russian internal demand, trade volumes between 
the Visegrad countries and Russia had been generally 
growing quite intensively until 2014. In the case of 
Poland, for example, turnover reached 26,8 billion 
euro in 2013, illustrating almost a tenfold increase 
since the beginning of the millennium. Russia has 
thus regained its position of an important trade 
partner for Visegrad countries, especially when 
non-EU countries are taken into consideration. The 
vast majority of trade, however, occurs with the EU 
member states, and Russia´s share in total foreign 
trade of individual countries has only reached single 
digits. Moreover, mutual investments have been 
statistically rather insignificant, with sporadic large-
scale investment projects such as the Paks 2 nuclear 
power plant project in Hungary.
Nevertheless, the tumultuous events that 
occurred in Ukraine and eventually led to the 
Russian annexation of Crimea and involvement in 
the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine represented 
a significant challenge for relations between the 
Visegrad countries and Russia. In its immediate 
aftermath, mutual contacts almost completely froze 
and the level of economic cooperation diminished. 
The volume of total trade between the Visegrad 
countries and Russia has experienced a notable 
decrease since 2014. The emerging tensions spurred 
a wave of uncertainty among the governments and 
business communities as to whether this challenge 
represented a temporary phase or a new state of 
relations which would require necessary adjustments.
When examining the impact of sanctions 
against Russia and Russian counter-sanctions on 
the economies of the Visegrad countries, there 
is an asymmetry between their expected and 
real impact. One should not dismiss losses that 
incurred to certain sectors and producers with 
poorly diversified portfolio largely reliant on Russian 
customers (apple exports in Poland recorded a 
12% drop in 2015), but from the macroeconomic 
point of view, the economies have been only 
slightly affected. For example, despite Hungary’s 
generally negative attitude towards sanctions, one 
could hardly identify any particular sectors where 
economic interests would have been directly hit by 
the sanctions. Most of the companies hit by sanctions 
have successfully adapted to the new circumstances 
by redirecting their exports to other markets, or by 
moving their production to Russia. Moreover, within 
the agricultural sector, the EU provided partial 
compensation and in combination with government 
support, this created an impetus for adjustments to 
the Visegrad state’s export strategies.
It is important to note, however, that it is almost 
impossible to assess the full effect of the sanctions 
regime due to other crucial factors at play that 
are difficult to disentangle. These factors include 
the sharp decline in commodity prices in 2015, the 
devaluation of rouble, the consequent weakening 
of Russia’s purchasing power or Russian policies 
adopted in order to enhance its self-sufficiency. In 
light of these developments, sanctions are believed 
to play only a minor role in the overall plunge of 
bilateral trade with Russia.
All four Visegrad countries have developed 
institutional mechanisms to promote and secure 
trade with Russia, including inter-governmental 
commissions for economic and scientific cooperation. 
The variety of ways of how the commissions’ works 
have been influenced in light of the Ukrainian 
conflict nicely reflect and illustrate the differences in 
each individual country’s approach towards Russia. 
All of these intergovernmental bodies suspended 
their work and did not convene in immediate 
reaction to Russia’s activities in Ukraine but as time 
passed, they engaged Russia on a different set of 
trajectories. While there are no talks about resuming 
the commission’s work in Poland, in Slovakia and the 
Czech Republic they have already reconvened, in 2015 
and 2016 respectively. In Hungary, the administrative 
levels had gradually lost their importance, and the 
committee’s functions were taken over by a system of 
political messengers and clienteles.
Polish restraints, Hungarian relative openness 
and Czech and Slovak hesitant positions towards 
Russia have been visible also in the energy sector, 
especially with regards to planned projects such as 
the Nord Stream 2 pipeline or the construction of 
nuclear power plants. All the Visegrad countries are 
heavily dependent on Russia’s oil and gas supplies 
and, with the exception of Poland, they largely rely on 
Russia’s supplies and technologies also in the nuclear 
energy field. Since the gas disputes between Russia 
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and Ukraine in 2009, ensuring higher energy security 
and independence has become a policy priority, and 
all the countries have achieved significant progress 
in this respect – they diversified the transport routes, 
and built gas reservoirs or interconnectors. However, 
there is no consensus among the Visegrad countries 
on whether further cooperation with Russia in the 
energy sector should be avoided or not. Poland is 
the fiercest opponent of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline 
project and while other Visegrad countries support 
its position (though the Czech Republic only very 
hesitantly), their general approach is much more 
pragmatic. To mention another example, in early 2014, 
Russia and Hungary signed an intergovernmental 
agreement on the construction of the Paks 2 nuclear 
power plant and despite controversies that this 
project has aroused given following developments in 
Ukraine, it has not been cancelled.
Since the adoption of sanctions a clear asymmetry 
between the official diplomatic positions and the 
political rhetoric directed at domestic audiences 
has been visible. Although the actual economic 
losses of these restrictive measures have been 
rather limited, various political figures and business 
representatives are likely to continue suggesting 
that sanctions aimed at changing Russia´s behavior 
towards Ukraine are having limited effect and that 
Russia represents an indispensable market which 
should not be abandoned. It is, however, critical to 
explore motivations behind these calls. Are they 
driven by a desire to enhance economic performance 
of the individual states or by own interests and 
profits of influential persons and groups with close 
ties to Russia. This study examined the current state 
of Visegrad countries’ economic relations with Russia, 
juxtaposed it with the populist discourses, and 
identified the influential players and their motivations. 
By doing so, it helped to better understand the 
situation and pointed to important realities that 
should be considered when formulating future 
policies towards Russia.
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SUPPLEMENT
Standard International Trade Classification
SITC0 Food and live animals
SITC1 Beverages and tobacco 
SITC2 Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
SITC3  Mineral fuels, lubricants 
and related materials
SITC4 Animals and vegetable oils, fats and waxes
SITC5 Chemicals and related products
SITC6  Manufactured goods classified 
chiefly by material
SITC7 Machinery and transport equipment
SITC8 Miscellaneous manufactured articles
SITC9  Commodities and transactions not 
classified elsewhere in the SITC
 
POLAND, TRADE WITH RUSSIA mil. EUR
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
IMPORTS 13 711 9 085 13 625 18 078 21 559 18 654 17 060 12 618 10 272
SHARE OF IMPORTS 10% 8% 10% 12% 14% 12% 10% 7% 6%
EXPORTS 6 041 3 594 5 042 6 080 7 724 8 113 7 006 5 119 5 207
SHARE OF EXPORTS 5% 4% 4% 4% 5% 5% 4% 3% 3%
BALANCE OF TRADE -7 669 -5 491 -8 583 -11 998 -13 834 -10 541 -10 054 -7 499 -5 065
TRADE TURNOVER 19 752 12 679 18 667 24 158 29 283 26 767 24 067 17 737 15 478
CZECH REPUBLIC, TRADE WITH RUSSIA mil. EUR
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
IMPORTS 5 987 3 721 4 893 5 235 5 750 5 383 4 148 3 133 2 113
SHARE OF IMPORTS 6% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 2% 2%
EXPORTS 2 911 1 877 2 673 3 758 4 696 4 474 4 105 2 889 2 780
SHARE OF EXPORTS 3% 2% 3% 3% 4% 4% 3% 2% 2%
BALANCE OF TRADE -3 076 -1 843 -2 221 -1 476 -1 054 -909 -42 -243 667
TRADE TURNOVER 8 897 5 598 7 566 8 993 10 446 9 857 8 253 6 022 4 894
HUNGARY, TRADE WITH RUSSIA mil. EUR
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
IMPORTS 6 651 4 091 5 201 6 379 6 447 6 395 5 404 3 282 2 376
SHARE OF IMPORTS 9% 7% 8% 9% 9% 8% 7% 4% 3%
EXPORTS 2 666 2 124 2 569 2 586 2 565 2 526 2 069 1 504 1 412
SHARE OF EXPORTS 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 3% 2% 2% 2%
BALANCE OF TRADE -3 986 -1 967 -2 632 -3 793 -3 882 -3 869 -3 335 -1 778 -963
TRADE TURNOVER 9 317 6 215 7 770 8 965 9 012 8 922 7 474 4 787 3 788
SLOVAKIA, OVERVIEW OF TRADE WITH RUSSIA mil. EUR
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
IMPORTS 5 258 3 473 4 679 6 212 5 949 6 064 4 780 3 433 2 646
SHARE OF IMPORTS 10% 9% 10% 11% 10% 10% 8% 5% 4%
EXPORTS 1 811 1 415 1 932 2 090 2 638 2 555 2 130 1 527 1 479
SHARE OF EXPORTS 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 2% 2%
BALANCE OF TRADE -3 448 -2 057 -2 747 -4 122 -3 311 -3 510 -2 650 -1 906 -1 167
TRADE TURNOVER 7 069 4 888 6 611 8 301 8 587 8 619 6 910 4 960 4 125
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Graph 14: Slovak-Russian Exports in SITC
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Graph 15: Slovak-Russian Imports in SITC
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Graph 16: Czech-Russian Exports in SITC
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Graph 17: Czech-Russian Imports in SITC
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Graph 18: Polish-Russian Exports in SITC
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Graph 19: Polish-Russian Imports in SITC
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Graph 20: Hungarian-Russian Exports in SITC
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Graph 21: Hungarian-Russian Imports in SITC
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